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Abstract
Satellite conjunction analysis is the assessment of collision risk during a close encounter between a satellite and
another object in orbit. A counterintuitive phenomenon has emerged in the conjunction analysis literature: probability
dilution, in which lower quality data paradoxically appear to reduce the risk of collision. We show that probability
dilution is a symptom of a fundamental deficiency in epistemic probability distributions. In probabilistic representa-
tions of statistical inference, there are always false propositions that have a high probability of being assigned a high
degree of belief. We call this deficiency false confidence. In satellite conjunction analysis, it results in a severe and
persistent underestimation of collision risk exposure.
We introduce the Martin–Liu validity criterion as a benchmark by which to identify statistical methods that are
free from false confidence. If expressed using belief functions, such inferences will necessarily be non-additive.
In satellite conjunction analysis, we show that Kσ uncertainty ellipsoids satisfy the validity criterion. Performing
collision avoidance maneuvers based on ellipsoid overlap will ensure that collision risk is capped at the user-specified
level. Further, this investigation into satellite conjunction analysis provides a template for recognizing and resolving
false confidence issues as they occur in other problems of statistical inference.
Keywords: belief functions, epistemic uncertainty, statistical inference, collision risk, satellite conjunction analysis,
probability dilution
1. Introduction
A satellite conjunction is an event in which two satellites or a satellite and a piece of debris are estimated to pass
near each other. The goal of satellite conjunction analysis is to determine whether the risk of collision is high enough to
necessitate a collision avoidance maneuver. Avoiding collision is not just important to the individual satellite operator.
Everyone in the aerospace industry has a stake in minimizing the number of in-orbit collisions. Each collision adds to
the debris already in orbit, and in aggregate, this debris has the potential to make low Earth orbit unnavigable [1, 2, 3].
The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that the number of active satellites is expected to dramatically increase
over the next few years [4, 5]. So, while some of the issues involved in conjunction analysis may initially seem arcane,
correctly resolving those issues is of existential importance to the aerospace industry.
1.1. A Modern Problem
Over the past 15 years, aerospace researchers have recognized a counterintuitive phenomenon in the collision
risk numbers obtained in satellite conjunction analysis. It is called probability dilution [6]. Past a certain point, as
uncertainty in the satellite trajectories increases, the epistemic probability of collision decreases. Since trajectory
uncertainty is driven by errors in tracking data, the seemingly absurd implication of probability dilution is that lower
quality data reduce the risk of collision.
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Several researchers have attempted to synthesize an ad hoc fix to probability dilution [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Most of them
have defined an alternative collision risk metric that is increasing, or at least non-decreasing, as a function of trajectory
uncertainty. However, none of these researchers has offered a rigorous explanation for why probability dilution is
supposedly wrong or, at least, how it is misleading. They all proceed on the basis that its counterintuitiveness is proof
of its inappropriateness.
Alternatively, some satellite operators have adopted a high sensitivity to small collision probabilities. For example,
the CARA group based at NASA Goddard monitors all conjunctions with a computed probability of collision greater
than 10−7, and conjunctions with a computed probability of collision greater than 4.4 × 10−4 are treated as high risk
[11]. However, if probability dilution is indicative of a fundamental problem with collision probabilities, it is not
immediately obvious that being sensitive to small collision probabilities will resolve that problem.
1.2. A Centuries-Old Argument
Satellite trajectory estimation is fundamentally a problem of statistical inference, and the confusion over proba-
bility dilution cuts to the heart of the long-standing Bayesian–frequentist debate in statistics (for a review, see [12]).
Satellite orbits are inferred using radar data, optical data, GPS data, etc. which are subject to random and bias er-
rors (i.e., noise). The resulting probability distributions used in conjunction analysis represent epistemic uncertainty,
rather than aleatory variability. That is to say, it is the trajectory estimates that are subject to random variation, not the
satellite trajectories themselves. In the Bayesian view, that is a distinction without a difference; it is considered natural
and correct to assess the probability of an event of interest, such as a possible collision between two satellites, based
on an epistemic probability distribution [13, 14, 15]. In the frequentist view, though, it is considered an anathema
to try to compute the probability of a non-random event [16, 17, 18]. This prohibition is expressed in some corners
of the uncertainty quantification community as the requirement that epistemic uncertainty be represented using non-
probabilistic mathematics [19, 20, 21]. Despite these objections, at present, satellite navigators appear to be adopting
the Bayesian position.
1.3. Definitions
An aleatory uncertainty is an uncertainty due to random (i.e., aleatory) variation of the quantity or event being
analyzed. An epistemic uncertainty is uncertainty due to imperfect knowledge about the quantity or event being
analyzed. One of the many ways in which epistemic uncertainty can arise in a fixed quantity is if the data used to
measure or infer it are subject to random errors.
A belief function is a function used to represent the amount of positive support a proposition has accrued from the
evidence. A plausibility function merely represents the lack of evidence against a proposition. Belief and plausibility
are complementary functions; that is, Pls(A) = 1 − Bel(¬A), for every proposition, A, and its complement (i.e.,
negation) ¬A. As a rule, the plausibility accorded to a proposition is always greater than or equal to the belief
accorded to it. An additive belief function is a belief function that satisfies the Kolmogorov axioms and in which, as
a consequence, Bel(A) = Pls(A) for all propositions [22].
An epistemic probability is an additive belief function used to represent epistemic uncertainty. Confidence dis-
tributions1, fiducial distributions, and importantly, most Bayesian posterior distributions2 are epistemic probability
distributions. An aleatory probability is a probability used to represent aleatory uncertainty. It is equal to the frac-
tion of trials in which a specified event occurs (or would occur) over an infinite number of equivalent random trials.
The mathematics of aleatory and epistemic probability functions are identical. The distinction is purely a question
of subject matter. The use of aleatory probabilities is generally accepted. Only epistemic probability is a topic of
controversy.
1.4. Our Contribution
In this paper, we pursue basic questions raised by probability dilution. Can satellite operators take epistemic
probability at face value as a risk metric? If not, why not? What alternatives are safe for use in conjunction analysis?
How can we know that those alternatives are safe? We address these questions, in part, by placing conjunction analysis
1We refer to confidence distributions in the sense of [23], as opposed to [24] and [25], which eschew epistemic probabilities.
2One could argue that a posterior probability derived using an aleatory prior, as in [26], is itself an aleatory probability.
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in its context as a problem of statistical inference. Consequently, what we discover about probability dilution has broad
implications for statisticians as well as satellite operators.
In Section 2, we provide a thorough exposition of and explanation for probability dilution. This has previously
been lacking in the literature. We show that the counterintuitiveness of probability dilution is entirely due to the fact
that, in conjunction analysis, probability of collision is an epistemic probability, rather than an aleatory probability.
Moreover, we show that probability dilution is linked to a more severe operational defect that we call false confidence.
We then evaluate the efficacy of pursuing small epistemic probabilities as a way to mitigate the problems posed by
false confidence.
In Section 3, we show that false confidence is not limited to conjunction analysis. All epistemic probability
distributions are subject to false confidence. That is, in any additive belief function used to represent epistemic
uncertainty, there are false propositions that have a high probability of being assigned a high belief value. The false
confidence generated by epistemic probability of collision in satellite conjunction analysis is a manifestation of this
more general deficiency.
In Section 4, we demonstrate a framework for identifying statistical methods that are free from false confidence.
We build this approach on the “validity criterion” introduced in the Martin–Liu Theory of Inferential Models [27].
For a statistical inference to be valid in the Martin–Liu sense, only a true proposition may have a high probability
of being assigned a high belief value. An inference satisfying this criterion will not suffer from the false confidence
phenomenon described in Section 3. Note that the reader does not need to be familiar with Martin–Liu theory to
understand the work presented in this paper. Only the validity criterion is used, and its formal definition is provided
in Section 4.
2. Epistemic Probability of Collision
Epistemic probability of collision is coming into more common use as a risk metric in satellite conjunction anal-
ysis [11, 28, 29]. In fact, the most-cited literature on satellite conjunction analysis simply takes it for granted that
epistemic probability of collision is the correct way to represent collision risk, e.g., [30, 31, 32]. However, the coun-
terintuitiveness of probability dilution, combined with the unsettled status of epistemic probability in the statistics and
uncertainty quantification communities, calls this practice into question.
This part of the paper explores issues surrounding the use of epistemic probability of collision as a risk metric
for satellite conjunction analysis. Section 2.1 reviews the standard computation of collision probability. Section 2.2
describes how probability dilution arises from those mathematics. Section 2.3 describes a more severe operational
defect in epistemic collision probabilities: false confidence. Section 2.4 explores the use of small thresholds for
epistemic probability as a way to counteract false confidence.
2.1. Computation of Collision Probability
As mentioned in Section 1.2, satellite conjunction analysis is rooted in a problem of statistical inference. The
inferred parameter of interest is the vector of positions and velocities of the two satellites at time of closest approach.
That is,
θ = (u1, v1,w1, u˙1, v˙1, w˙1, u2, v2,w2, u˙2, v˙2, w˙2)>
where u1, v1,w1 are the position of one satellite; u˙1, v˙1, w˙1 are its velocity; u2, v2,w2 are the position of the other
satellite; u˙2, v˙2, w˙2 are its velocity. The true value of θ is unknown; it is estimated using tracking data, x, via an
inferential algorithm called a “filter” that delivers an estimate, θˆ(x), along with its uncertainty, expressed as a 12 × 12
covariance matrix, CΘ. In this paper, uncertainty in θ is attributed to random errors in the tracking data. In reality,
uncertainty also arises from errors in the dynamics model used in the filter.
Uncertainty in the trajectory estimates is usually assumed to have a multivariate normal distribution [6, 30, 31].
The epistemic probability density for θ is therefore taken to be
fx(θ) =
{
(2pi)12 det(CΘ)
}−1/2
exp
{
−1
2
(
θˆ(x) − θ
)>
C−1Θ
(
θˆ(x) − θ
)}
where det(CΘ) is the determinant of CΘ. This epistemic probability distribution for θ can be rationalized in two ways.
One way is to treat filter estimation as an implementation of Bayesian inference [33]. The other way is to describe
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this representation as a fiducial distribution for θ, in the sense of [34], or a confidence distribution for θ, in the sense
of [23], on the argument that a random resampled θˆ(X) would have a multivariate normal distribution with mean θ and
covariance matrix CΘ, where X represents a random realization of the tracking data, drawn from the same distribution
as x, the tracking data actually obtained. The opening of Section 4.2 briefly describes the conditions under which the
normality assumption will and will not hold.
Assuming normality holds, the standard epistemic probability of collision calculation proceeds in three steps.
First, uncertainty in θ is propagated to uncertainty in the relative offset between the two satellites at closest approach.
That is,
∆u = u2 − u1 ∆v = v2 − v1 ∆w = w2 − w1.
Since the linear transform of a multivariate normal distribution is itself a multivariate normal distribution, the triple
(∆u,∆v,∆w) has a multivariate normal distribution with the following 3 × 3 covariance matrix:
C∆ = ACΘA> where A =
−1 0 0 0 0 0 +1 0 0 0 0 00 −1 0 0 0 0 0 +1 0 0 0 00 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 +1 0 0 0

or more compactly
C∆ = CΘ;1:3,1:3 + CΘ;7:9,7:9 − 2CΘ;1:3,7:9,
where CΘ;m1:m2,n1:n2 is the sub-matrix of all entries in rows i and columns j such that m1 ≤ i ≤ m2 and n1 ≤ j ≤ n2.
That is, C∆ is the sum of the covariance matrices for the positions of the two satellites minus the covariance between
the positions of the two satellites.
In the second step, uncertainty along the axis parallel to the relative velocity vector is integrated out. That is,
instead of computing probability of collision as the probability of the true value of the displacement falling within
the set of (∆u,∆v,∆w) values indicative of collision, probability of collision is computed as the probability accorded
to an extruded ellipse containing that three-dimensional set. The theoretical rationale behind this move is that it
captures uncertainty in the timing of closest approach [31]. The primary practical effect of this step is to reduce
a three-dimensional integration problem to a two-dimensional integration problem. More nuanced ways of treating
uncertainty in the timing of closest approach are available [35, 36], but the standard two-dimensional treatment is
sufficient for our analysis.
This transformation is executed in a few sub-steps. It starts with the unit vector in the relative velocity direction,
i∆V , defined as
∆V = (u˙2, v˙2, w˙2) − (u˙1, v˙1, w˙1) and i∆V = ∆V‖∆V‖ .
Next, another direction in the plane perpendicular to i∆V can be defined arbitrarily. For example it could be taken as
in the same direction as the cross-product of i∆V and (∆u,∆v,∆w), assuming that they are not aligned. Denote this
arbitrary direction vector as iu′ . The final direction vector is simply the cross-product, iv′ = i∆V × iu′ . Once this system
has been established, define the rotated displacement vector asu
′
v′
w′
 = M
∆u∆v
∆w
 where M =
 i
>
u′
i>v′
i>
∆V

is the rotation matrix. The covariance matrix for the rotated (u′, v′,w′) vector is
C∆′ = MC∆M>.
Since (u′, v′,w′) has a multivariate normal distribution, uncertainty in the ∆V direction can be integrated out by simply
dropping w′. That completes the extrusion step, reducing the problem to the two-dimensional (u′, v′) space, with point
estimate (uˆ′, vˆ′) and covariance matrix C∆′;1:2,1:2.
The third and final step in the standard calculation of collision probability is to define the probability of collision
as the epistemic probability of having u′ and v′ such that u′2 + v′2 ≤ R2, where R is the sum of the characteristic radii
of the two satellites in the conjunction event. In other words, the satellite shapes are ignored; they are approximated
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Figure 1: Epistemic probability of collision as a function of estimated relative displacement, D/R, and relative uncertainty, S/R.
as spherical objects. Collision occurs if and only if, at closest approach, the distance between the two satellites is less
than their combined size.
This probability integral can be re-expressed in a standardized probability space, by performing an eigendecom-
position of the displacement covariance matrix [10], which yields[
u′
v′
]
=
[
uˆ′
vˆ′
]
− ES
[
S 1 0
0 S 2
] [
ξ1
ξ2
]
where S 21 and S
2
2 are the eigenvalues of C∆′;1:2,1:2; ES is a 2×2 matrix whose columns are the normalized eigenvectors
of C∆′;1:2,1:2; and finally, ξ1 and ξ2 are independent unit normal variables, with mean zero and variance one. Note that,
since ES is the eigendecomposition of a symmetric matrix, E>S ES returns the identity matrix. Defining u
′′ and v′′ as
the E>S rotation of u
′ and v′, the magnitude of (u′′, v′′) is equal to the magnitude of (u′, v′). That is,[
u′′
v′′
]
= E>S
[
u′
v′
]
=⇒ u′′2 + v′′2 = u′2 + v′2, u′′ = uˆ′′ − S 1ξ1, and v′′ = vˆ′′ − S 2ξ2.
Thus, the following equivalences hold for the integration condition:
u′2 + v′2 ≤ R2 ⇐⇒ u′′2 + v′′2 ≤ R2 ⇐⇒ (S 1ξ1 − uˆ′′)2 + (S 2ξ2 − vˆ′′)2 ≤ R2.
What has been accomplished is that now, instead of integrating a circle in a (u′, v′) space that will vary from problem
to problem, we are integrating an ellipse in a standardized unit normal (ξ1, ξ2) space. The centroid of that ellipse is
located at (uˆ′′/S 1, vˆ′′/S 2), and its semi-major and semi-minor axes are R/S 1 and R/S 2.
Following the logic of [37], the epistemic probability of collision is computed using a contour integral transfor-
mation, as follows:
Bel(C) =
∫∫
(S 1ξ1−uˆ′′)2+(S 2ξ2−vˆ′′)2≤R2
1
2pi
exp
[
−1
2
(
ξ21 + ξ
2
2
)]
dξ1dξ2
=
∫ 2pi
0
1 − e−r2ψ/22pir2ψ
 ( R2S 1S 2 + uˆ
′′R
S 1S 2
cosψ +
vˆ′′R
S 1S 2
sinψ
)
dψ
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where
r2ψ =
(
uˆ′′
S 1
+
R
S 1
cosψ
)2
+
(
vˆ′′
S 2
+
R
S 2
sinψ
)2
.
This integral can be approximated to negligible error using the trapezoidal rule, provided that at least 10×max (S 1/S 2, S 2/S 1)
evenly spaced quadrature points are used [10].
Because our goal is to understand and explore how the epistemic probability of collision changes for different
levels of uncertainty, we pursue the special case where S = S 1 = S 2. Defining the estimated displacement as
D =
√
uˆ′′2 + vˆ′′2 =
√
uˆ′2 + vˆ′2, this simplification reduces the epistemic probability of collision to a function of two
ratios: estimated relative displacement, D/R, and relative uncertainty, S/R.
2.2. Probability Dilution
Figure 1 illustrates epistemic probability of collision as a function of S/R for several values of D/R. These curves
follow a common pattern. So long as D/R > 1, for small uncertainties, the probability of collision is small. That
much makes intuitive sense. If the satellites are estimated to miss each other, and the uncertainty in those trajectory
estimates is small, then it is natural that the analyst have a high confidence that the satellites are not going to collide.
Similarly, it makes sense that as uncertainty grows, the risk of collision also grows. However, something odd happens
in the curves in Figure 1. Epistemic probability of collision eventually hits a maximum, and past that maximum, as
relative uncertainty rises, the epistemic probability of collision decreases.
This decrease is called probability dilution, and it has an odd implication. Since the uncertainty in the estimates of
the trajectories reflects the limits of data quality, probability dilution seems to imply that lowering data quality makes
satellites safer. That implication is counterintuitive in the extreme [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. As a rule, lowering the data quality
makes any engineering system less safe, and to claim that ignorance somehow reduces collision risk seems foolish on
its face.
That being said, the mathematics of probability dilution are ironclad and relatively simple. Recall that, when
expressed in unit normal space, the integration region determining the probability of collision is an ellipse whose
centroid is at (uˆ′′/S 1, vˆ′′/S 2) and whose semi-major and semi-minor axes are R/S 1 and R/S 2. Figure 2 illustrates
how the integration region changes as a function of S , when S = S 1 = S 2. Combined satellite size, R, and estimated
distance at closest approach, D, are held fixed with D/R = 5. For four different values of S/R, the integration region
is illustrated, along with the corresponding probability of collision.
Increasing the level of uncertainty has two effects on the integration region. The integration region shrinks, and
it draws closer to the origin. The probability density of a unit normal space is highest at the origin, decreasing
exponentially as a function of the square of distance from the origin. If D/R > 1, the positive effect due to getting
closer to the origin, where there is more probability mass, initially outweighs the negative effect due to shrinking the
integration region. Near the origin, though, the probability density curve flattens out. So, after a certain point, there is
not much more probability mass to be gained by moving closer to the origin, and the negative effect of shrinking the
integration region overtakes the positive effect due to shifting the location of the integration region. Past that point,
probability of collision decreases as uncertainty increases. That is why probability dilution happens, from a purely
mathematical perspective; it is due to a simple and straightforward shrinkage of the integration region, relative to
displacement uncertainty.
Even if the normality assumptions and shape assumptions were relaxed, the integration region would still undergo
the same shrinkage phenomenon that is illustrated in Figure 2. Each satellite represents a bounded set of points.
The displacement values indicative of collision are therefore also a bounded set of points. If one were to relax the
assumptions outlined in Section 2.1, instead of a shrinking ellipse, one would have a shrinking irregular shape in
a standardized three-dimensional probability space. Probability of collision would still have the same qualitative
behavior as a function of relative uncertainty. Mathematically speaking, the key factor underpinning probability
dilution is that the integration region (i.e., failure domain) is bounded.
There is no way of reframing satellite conjunction analysis so that the failure domain is not bounded. Therefore,
if we take the view that epistemic probability is valid, then it would seem that probability dilution is fundamental to
conjunction analysis. Why, then, do aerospace researchers [6, 7, 8, 9, 10] find this supposed mathematical inevitability
so counterintuitive?
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Figure 2: Epistemic probability of collision and integration region, given D/R = 5 and S/R ∈ {1.6, 3.5, 20, 160}. In the right panel, the 1σ, 2σ,
and 3σ contours for unit normal space are marked with dashed lines for reference. These three contours capture 39.3%, 86.5%, and 98.9% of the
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Interestingly, were the uncertainty in the satellite trajectories aleatory, rather than epistemic, probability dilution
would actually make sense. For example, suppose two satellites were known, with certainty, to be on a collision
course, and the satellite operator could only impart an impulse of random magnitude in a random direction, say,
via a poorly controlled maneuvering thruster on a tumbling satellite. If the mean of this distribution were the null
vector, due to a lack of control over thrust direction, then the higher the variance of the added impulse, the bigger the
resulting perturbation and hence the smaller the resulting probability of collision. In this example, the mean of the
resulting trajectory distribution would still have the satellites on a collision trajectory, but if one applies a big enough
impulse to one of the satellites in a random direction, that poorly controlled collision avoidance maneuver still has
a high probability of success. In that context, higher variance in a satellite’s trajectory really does reduce the risk of
collision.
However, in this hypothetical example, it is a variance in the trajectory itself that makes the satellite safer, not a
variance in the estimate of that trajectory. It should go without saying that, given two satellites on a sure collision
trajectory, simply recomputing the trajectories with lower quality data does not make them safer. There is, therefore,
an operational distinction to be made between genuine aleatory variability and epistemic uncertainty.
To summarize, the problem with probability dilution is not the mathematics. The mathematics are incontrovertible,
and they even make sense in the right context. Probability dilution is only counterintuitive when orbit “variance”
reflects the limits of data quality, rather than genuine aleatory variability in the orbits themselves. So, if probability
dilution is inappropriate, that inappropriateness must be rooted in a mismatch between the fundamental mathematics
of probability theory and the epistemic uncertainty to which they are applied in conjunction analysis.
2.3. False Confidence
The final clue indicating the inappropriateness of probability dilution is the fact that, for a fixed S/R ratio, there is
a maximum computable epistemic probability of collision. Whether or not the two satellites are on a collision course,
no matter what results are obtained, the analyst will have a minimum confidence that the satellites will not collide.
That minimum confidence is determined purely by the data quality.
For all S/R, the maximum collision probability is obtained when D/R = 0; that is, when the best estimate of the
two satellite paths indicates that they are on a collision course. Therefore, the curve for D/R = 0 in Figure 1 yields
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Figure 3: Aleatory probability of failure to detect an impending collision as a function of epistemic probability threshold for S/R ∈
{2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200}. The left panel gives the error rate curves for a head-on collision, DT = 0. The right panel gives the error rate curves for a
glancing collision, DT = R. The vertical dashed lines correspond to the CARA lower and upper thresholds reported in [11] as 10−7 and 4.4× 10−4.
the maximum computable probability of collision as a function of S/R. For example, if the uncertainty in the distance
between two satellites at closest approach is ten times the combined size of the two satellites, the analyst will always
compute at least a 99.5% confidence that the satellites are safe, even if, in reality, they are not.
A relative uncertainty of ten may sound high, but it may help the reader to keep in mind the magnitude of the tra-
jectories being estimated, relative to the size of the objects on those trajectories. Satellite trajectories are measured in
thousands of kilometers; satellites are measured in meters. Trajectory uncertainties in conjunction analysis are usually
measured in hundreds of meters [38]. For conjunction analysis done more than a week in advance, those uncertainties
can grow to kilometers [39]. As a consequence, S/R ratios greater than ten are the rule, not the exception. Under
those circumstances, even if two satellites are on a collision course, because of probability dilution, the epistemic
probability of collision is guaranteed to be small.
The biggest problem with probability dilution is not its counterintuitiveness; the biggest problem with probability
dilution is the false confidence that it imbues. Due to probability dilution, satellite navigators using epistemic prob-
ability of collision as their collision risk metric will always compute a high confidence that their satellites are safe,
regardless of whether or not they really are. The only rare exceptions are conjunctions in which both satellites are
extremely well-tracked and at least one of them is relatively large (for an example, see [40]). From an operational
perspective, if taken at face value, epistemic probability of collision is a misleading risk metric.
2.4. Pursuing Small Epistemic Probabilities
As mentioned in Section 1.1, there are some satellite navigators who treat epistemic probabilities of collision on
the order of 10−3 as high risk. So, it would be inaccurate to characterize the entire satellite operations community
as taking epistemic probabilities at face value. For example, the CARA team at NASA Goddard treats epistemic
probability of collision as though it were a test statistic. They calibrate epistemic probability thresholds in an effort to
achieve desired frequentist error rates, using historical data from past conjunctions as a reference population [11].
Unfortunately, even the idea of compensating for false confidence by setting a low threshold for epistemic prob-
ability of collision is problematic, because data quality modulates the relationship between epistemic probability of
collision and the real aleatory probability of failing to detect an impending collision. To model this relationship,
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we consider the aleatory variability of predicted distance, D, between two satellites at closest approach, if the data
used to produce that prediction were redrawn from the same distribution as the actual data obtained. Assuming that
variability in the estimated direction of relative velocity is small enough to be neglected, the marginalization and
eigendecomposition steps can proceed as in Section 2.1. This yields
D2 = Uˆ′′2 + Vˆ ′′2 =
(
u′′ + S 1ξ1
)2
+
(
v′′ + S 2ξ2
)2
where (u′′, v′′) is the true unknown two-dimensional relative displacement between the two satellites; Uˆ′′ and Vˆ ′′ are
the random resampled analog to uˆ′′ and vˆ′′ from Section 2.1; S 1 and S 2 are the principle standard deviations of the
marginalized two-dimensional covariance matrix, as in Section 2.1; and ξ1 and ξ2 are independent unit normal random
variables.
In the case where S 1 = S 2 = S , this simplifies to(D
S
)2
=
(
u′′
S
+ ξ1
)2
+
(
v′′
S
+ ξ2
)2
.
This can be further reduced to (D
S
)
=
√
χ2
2;(DT /S )2
where χ2j,δ is a non-central chi-squared random variable with j degrees of freedom and non-centrality parameter δ and
DT =
√
u′′2 + v′′2
is the unknown true distance between the two satellites at closest approach.
In Section 2.1, we showed how epistemic probability of collision can be computed as a function of D/S and S/R.
Given a fixed S/R, epistemic probability of collision is a decreasing function of D/S . So, given a fixed detection
threshold for epistemic probability, the aleatory probability of detecting an impending collision is equal to the proba-
bility of obtaining an observed D/S that is less than or equal to the critical D/S that yields an epistemic probability
of collision equal to the threshold value. Rather than try to compute this relationship directly, it is easier to sim-
ply generate D/S values from its non-central chi-squared distribution and then compute the corresponding epistemic
probabilities of collision. This yields epistemic probability threshold as a function of desired detection rate, which
can be reversed to give the aleatory probability of failing to detect an impending collision as a function of a satellite
operator’s chosen detection threshold for epistemic probability of collision.
Figure 3 illustrates this relationship for several values of S/R in two scenarios, an impending head-on collision
with DT = 0 and an impending glancing collision with DT = R. The two dashed vertical lines mark the lower and
upper thresholds for epistemic probability of collision reported in [11]. Conjunctions with an epistemic probability of
collision less than 10−7 are treated as lowest risk and ignored. Conjunctions with an epistemic probability of collision
greater than 4.4 × 10−4 are treated as high risk events. Using these thresholds, if S/R = 10, an impending head-on
collision has a 91.2% chance of correctly being identified as a high risk conjunction. Similarly, a glancing collision
with S/R = 10 has a 91.1% chance of being correctly identified as high risk. So, broadly speaking, one could say
that the CARA threshold has reasonably good performance for S/R = 10. Unfortunately, that performance degrades
quickly as uncertainty increases. At S/R = 20, the aleatory probability of correctly identifying an impending collision
as a high risk conjunction drops to 64.8%. For S/R > 33.74, the aleatory probability of detecting an impending
collision using the 4.4 × 10−4 threshold drops to zero. For example, in a conjunction between two objects with a
combined radius of five meters, a satellite navigator using the CARA upper risk threshold will have zero chance of
detecting an impending collision unless or until their predicted displacement uncertainty drops below 170 meters.
In short, trying to compensate for false confidence by pursuing small epistemic probabilities of collision appears
to be an unproductive strategy. Even small epistemic probabilities end up distorted, and they still result in false
confidence under conditions that satellite navigators regularly encounter. Furthermore, the relationship between data
quality and false confidence is more complicated than we have depicted in this idealized analysis. It depends not only
on S/R but also on S 1/S 2, and in reality, S 1 and S 2 are never equal. Every conjunction has a unique combination of
covariance matrices. So, if an analyst wants to hold the risk of failed detection at a consistent level, it is necessary to
define a different epistemic probability threshold for each and every conjunction. In other words, epistemic probability
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of collision could, theoretically, be used as a test statistic3, but it cannot be taken directly as a risk metric, even if
satellite navigators are sensitive to small epistemic probabilities of collision. There is no single threshold for epistemic
probability that will detect impending collisions with a consistent degree of statistical reliability.
3. The False Confidence Theorem
What causes probability dilution and false confidence? As explored in Section 2.2, it is not an error in the math-
ematics. Rather, it appears to be a mismatch between the mathematics of probability theory and the subject matter to
which those mathematics are applied in satellite conjunction analysis. As mentioned in Section 1.2, questions over
the appropriateness of epistemic probability have never been settled. As shown in Section 2.4, those questions take
on an undeniably practical dimension in satellite conjunction analysis.
This part of the paper introduces the false confidence theorem. Section 3.1 suggests that probability dilution
and false confidence are rooted in the axioms of probability theory. Section 3.2 posits a formal definition for false
confidence. Section 3.3 proves that all epistemic probability distributions assign copious amounts of false confidence.
Section 3.4 places this theorem in the context of the Bayesian–frequentist debate.
3.1. Motivating Insight
Given highly uncertain data, it makes intuitive sense that one would not be certain of collision. With low-quality
data, an analyst should be reluctant to assign a high degree of belief to any proposition. The problem is that, within
the confines of probability theory, general non-commitment of belief is not an option. One of the axiomatic properties
of probability functions is that they are additive. So, any belief not assigned to “collision” is automatically assigned
to “not-collision,” i.e.,
Bel(¬C) = 1 − Bel(C) .
While a low assignment of belief to “collision” might seem natural when uncertainty is high, the consequently high
assignment of belief to “not-collision” seems unnatural. The implication here is profound. If additivity is the root
cause of false confidence, it means that false confidence is inherent to epistemic probability distributions, due to their
mathematical structure. In Section 3.3, we show that this is exactly the case.
3.2. Definition of False Confidence
Strictly speaking, one could characterize any confidence or belief assigned to a false proposition as “false confi-
dence.” However, since the whole point of statistical inference is that one does not know a priori the exact true value
of the parameter being inferred, it is to be expected that, in the course of any given inference, some false propositions
will be assigned some amount of belief. The problem described in Sections 2.3-2.4 is more severe: There are fixed
false propositions that are guaranteed or nearly guaranteed to be assigned a high belief value.
This suggests a formal definition for false confidence. An inferential method can formally be said to suffer from
false confidence if, for any arbitrarily specified fixed level of belief and probability of assignment, short of unity,
there is at least one false proposition to which the method will have at least the prescribed probability of assigning at
least the prescribed level of belief. Next we show that most epistemic probability distributions used in practice suffer
from false confidence. In other words, a procedure that draws inferences based on an additive belief function leads to
“systematically misleading conclusions” and, hence, is “unacceptable” [41].
3.3. Theorem
Most statistical inference in science and engineering involves one or more real-valued continuous parameter(s)
inferred from real-valued observables. Let the observable be X ∈ <n, and let the parameter be θ ∈ Ωθ ⊆ <m where m
is the number of parameters being inferred. The epistemic probability distributions (e.g., posteriors) commonly used in
practice are, for all values of the observable, continuous distributions over the parameter being inferred. That is, belief
assigned by the additive belief function BelΘ|x can be represented via an epistemic probability density function, say,
3Setting S =
√
S 1S 2, our analysis may provide a reasonable back-of-the-envelope estimate for the relationship between epistemic probability
threshold and failed detection rate, so long as S 1 and S 2 are not too unequal.
10
fx(θ), with respect to Lebesgue measure λ on Ωθ, depending on the observable x. We also assume that supθ fx(θ) < ∞
for ProX|θ-almost all x, for all θ. These assumptions describe an ordinary epistemic probability distribution in the sense
that most Bayesian posteriors, confidence distributions [23, 25, 24], and fiducial distributions [42, 43] used in practice
satisfy all of these assumptions. The false confidence theorem below states that all epistemic probability distributions
satisfying these assumptions suffer from false confidence.
Theorem 1. Consider an additive belief function BelΘ|x characterized by an epistemic probability density function
fx(θ) on Ωθ satisfying the assumptions above. Then for any θ ∈ Ωθ, any α ∈ (0, 1), and any p ∈ (0, 1), there exists a
set A ⊂ Ωθ such that
A = θ and ProX|θ({x : BelΘ|x(A) ≥ 1 − α}) ≥ p.
Proof. For fixed x, set f¯x = supθ fx(θ). Then for any bounded set B ⊂ Ωθ,
BelΘ|x(B) =
∫
B
fx(θ) dθ ≤ f¯x λ(B). (1)
As a function of X, for fixed θ, f¯X has a distribution; let η = ηθ,p ∈ (0,∞) satisfy
ProX|θ({x : f¯x ≤ η}) ≥ p.
Choose a neighborhood B 3 θ with measure λ(B) = α/η, so that λ(B) η = α. Define A as the complement of B. For
any belief function satisfying the Kolmogorov axioms, we have
BelΘ|x(A) = 1 − BelΘ|x(B). (2)
By definition, A = θ, and by (1) and (2), we have
f¯x ≤ η =⇒ BelΘ|x(B) ≤ λ(B) η ⇐⇒ BelΘ|x(B) ≤ α ⇐⇒ BelΘ|x(A) ≥ 1 − α.
By definition of η, the left-most event occurs with ProX|θ-probability at least p and, therefore, the right-most event
occurs with ProX|θ-probability at least p, proving the claim.
Mathematical formalism belies the simplicity of this proof. Given the continuity assumptions outlined above, one
can always define a neighborhood around the true parameter value that is so small that its complement—which, by
definition, represents a false proposition—is all but guaranteed to be assigned a high belief value, simply by virtue
of its size. That is the entirety of the proof. Further, “sample size” plays no role in this proof; it holds no matter
how much or how little information is used to construct the epistemic probability distribution in question. The false
confidence theorem applies anywhere that probability theory is used to represent epistemic uncertainty resulting from
a statistical inference.
3.4. Broader Implications
False confidence is the inevitable result of treating epistemic uncertainty as though it were aleatory variability. Any
probability distribution assigns high probability values to large sets. This is appropriate when quantifying aleatory
variability, because any realization of a random variable has a high probability of falling in any given set that is large
relative to its distribution. Statistical inference is different; a parameter with a fixed value is being inferred from
random data. Any proposition about the value of that parameter is either true or false. It is a bad inference that treats
a false proposition as though it were true, by consistently assigning it high belief values. That is the defect we see in
satellite conjunction analysis, and the false confidence theorem establishes that this defect is universal.
This finding opens a new front in the debate between Bayesian and frequentist schools of thought in statistics.
Traditional disputes over epistemic probability have focused on philosophical issues, such as the ontological inap-
propriateness of epistemic probability distributions [16, 44], the unjustified use of prior probabilities [45], and the
hypothetical logical consistency of personal belief functions in highly abstract decision-making scenarios [14, 46].
Despite these philosophical disputes, the statistics community has long enjoyed a truce sustained by results like the
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Bernstein–von Mises theorem [47, Ch. 10], which indicate that Bayesian and frequentist estimators usually converge
with moderate amounts of data.
Our discovery undermines that truce. The false confidence theorem establishes that the mathematical form in
which an inference is expressed can have practical consequences. This finding echoes past criticisms of epistemic
probability leveled by advocates of Dempster–Shafer theory, but those past criticisms focus on the supposed struc-
tural inability of probability theory to accurately represent incomplete prior knowledge, e.g., [20, Ch. 3]. The false
confidence theorem is much broader in its implications. It applies to all epistemic probability distributions, even those
derived from inferences to which the Bernstein–von Mises theorem would also seem to apply.
As a consequence of the false confidence theorem, it appears that, on the question of epistemic probability, the
frequentists are right and the Bayesians are wrong. It is not generally safe or sensible or harmless to try to compute
the probability of a non-random event. In satellite conjunction analysis, we have a clear real-world example in which
the deleterious effects of false confidence are too large and too important to be overlooked. In other applications, there
will be propositions similarly affected by false confidence. The question that one must resolve on a case-by-case basis
is whether the affected propositions are of practical interest. It is a problem for which one must check in any Bayesian
posterior, fiducial distribution, or confidence distribution.
For now, we focus on identifying an approach to satellite conjunction analysis that is free from false confidence.
Probability theory is not the only framework for representing epistemic uncertainty. A cornucopia of alternative
axiomatic frameworks exist, most of which are non-additive [48]. While the false confidence theorem definitively
establishes that probability theory is an inappropriate framework for representing epistemic uncertainty, this does not
pose an insurmountable difficulty. We only need to identify a more appropriate framework.
4. The Martin–Liu Validity Criterion
The false confidence theorem establishes that, to be free from false confidence, it is a necessary condition that
a statistical inference be represented non-additively. However, while necessary, non-additivity is not sufficient. It is
trivially easy to imagine a non-additive belief function that is just slightly non-additive and therefore suffers from a
false confidence problem as bad or almost as bad as that depicted in Section 3. What we need is a criterion, by which
to constrain statistical inference, that is sufficient for eliminating false confidence.
The Martin–Liu validity criterion states that the aleatory probability with which a false proposition will be assigned
some amount of belief must be no more than one minus that level of belief [27]. Stated mathematically,
ProX|θ
({
x : BelΘ|x(A) ≥ 1 − α}) ≤ α, ∀α ∈ [0, 1] , A ⊂ Ωθ, s.t. A = θ. (3)
Since the Martin–Liu validity criterion explicitly limits the rate at which belief is assigned to false propositions,
it is almost a tautology that a statistical approach satisfying this criterion will not suffer from the false confidence
phenomenon described in Sections 2–3.
This part of the paper implements the Martin–Liu validity criterion as a way to identify statistical methods that are
free from false confidence. Section 4.1 proves the Martin–Liu validity of confidence intervals and confidence regions.
Section 4.2 shows that Kσ uncertainty ellipsoids can often be interpreted as confidence regions. This provides a
statistically reliable tool for managing collision risk in satellite conjunction analysis.
4.1. Confidence Regions
Frequentist confidence intervals and confidence regions have traditionally been rationalized via coverage proba-
bility. That is, a (1 − α) × 100% confidence interval or confidence region is accepted as valid because, over repeated
independent draws of the data, it has a probability of at least (1 − α) of covering the true parameter value. However,
if evaluated as tools for assigning belief to propositions (i.e., sets), confidence intervals and confidence regions also
satisfy the Martin–Liu validity criterion.
Let Γα(x) be the (1 − α) confidence region for θ given the realized data x. The natural assignment of belief and
plausibility made by this confidence region are
BelΘ|x(A) =
1 − α, A ⊃ Γα(x)0, A 2 Γα(x) PlsΘ|x(A) =
1, A ∩ Γα(x) , ∅α, A ∩ Γα(x) = ∅ .
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That is to say, a confidence region represents the simple assertion that we are 1 − α confident that the true value
of θ is somewhere inside Γα(x). Any sets containing Γα(x) inherit that confidence; all other sets accrue no positive
confidence. It is a coarse way to represent a statistical inference, perhaps more so than is necessary, but it is also safe
in the sense that the Martin–Liu validity criterion holds. Indeed, by the coverage probability definition of a confidence
region, the event {Γα(x) 3 θ} has ProX|θ-probability at least 1 − α. So, for any set A = θ, the event {Γα(x) ⊂ A} has
ProX|θ-probability at most α. Therefore, for any false proposition, i.e., any set A such that A = θ, the probability that
said proposition will be assigned a confidence of at least 1 − α is less than or equal to α, hence (3) holds.
When interpreted this way, a confidence region represents a consonant confidence structure; that is, a possibility
distribution with coverage probability properties [23]. A recent paper already proves that all consonant confidence
structures satisfy the Martin–Liu validity criterion [49]. The reason that we have included the special case proof
for confidence regions is that most readers are likely to be unfamiliar with possibility distributions and confidence
structures. In contrast, simple confidence intervals and confidence regions are well-established, well-disseminated
tools of statistical inference. As proven above, they do not suffer from false confidence.4
4.2. Uncertainty Ellipsoids in Satellite Conjunction Analysis
Uncertainty ellipsoids are already well-established as a screening tool in conjunction analysis [11, 50]. We propose
that they can be used as a principal risk management tool. Kσ ellipsoids, also known as covariance ellipsoids, can
often be treated as approximate confidence regions. The case for this interpretation starts by treating a satellite’s true
state, θ, as a fixed unknown with θˆ(x) as an estimate subject to random errors. If a sufficiently large amount of data is
used, the error between a satellite’s filter-derived state estimate and its true state can often be treated as approximately
normal, even if the observation errors are drawn from non-normal distributions [51] and even if the filter used is
sampling-based [52]. That is, in conjunction analysis, one can often assume
θˆ(X) − θ ∼ n(0,CΘ)
where n(0,CΘ) is a multivariate normal distribution with zero mean and covariance matrix CΘ. This assumption
may break down if a conjunction analysis is done too far in advance [39] or if too few data are used to estimate the
satellite state or if there is an unaccounted for bias error in the filter algorithm or data. For simplicity, we persist in the
normality and unbiasedness assumptions. Relaxing these assumptions is left as a topic for future work.
This representation of aleatory uncertainty in θˆ(X) − θ can be eigendecomposed as
θˆ(X) − θ = ECΘ
√
ΛCΘξ
where X is a (hypothetical) random realization drawn from the same distribution as the data used to estimate the
orbits, ECΘ is a matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors of CΘ, ΛCΘ is a diagonal matrix whose entries are the
corresponding eigenvalues of CΘ, and ξ is a unit normal vector of the same dimensionality as θ. This can easily be
rearranged into a pivot, as √
1/ΛCΘ E
>
CΘ
(
θˆ(X) − θ
)
= ξ
where 1/ΛCΘ is a diagonal matrix whose entries are the inverse of the eigenvalues of CΘ. Note that E
>
CΘ
and
√
1/ΛCΘ
are simply the inverses of ECΘ and
√
ΛCΘ , respectively. A pivot is a function of the parameter being inferred and the
random data used to infer it whose output is a random variable with a known fixed distribution [53]; in this case, ξ is
a unit normal vector. Pivots are special because they can be used to derive confidence regions.
In particular, we are interested Kσ uncertainty ellipsoids. A Kσ uncertainty ellipsoid on θ is generated by pro-
jecting a sphere in ξ-space centered at the origin. Let K > 0 be some constant. A confidence region of the form
Γα(x) =
θ′ : ξ = √1/ΛCΘ E>CΘ (θˆ(x) − θ′) , dim(θ)∑
i=1
ξ2i ≤ K2

4It may be helpful to remind the reader that, as pointed out in Section 3, confidence distributions in the sense of [23] do suffer from false
confidence, despite also being rationalized in terms of coverage probability. Consonance and coverage probability together are adequate to ensure
Martin–Liu validity, but coverage probability alone is not.
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will map to θ as a dim(θ)-dimensional ellipsoid. The confidence, (1−α), associated with this uncertainty ellipsoid can
be computed as
1 − α = ProX|θ({x : Γα(x) 3 θ}) = Proξ

ξ : dim(θ)∑
i=1
ξ2i ≤ K2

 = Fχ2;dim(θ)(K2)
where Fχ2; j : <+ → [0, 1] is the cumulative distribution function for a central χ2 distribution with j degrees of
freedom.
Software is commercially available that is capable of computing three-dimensional Kσ uncertainty ellipsoids rep-
resenting uncertainty in the predicted position of a satellite and then determining whether or not the resulting ellipsoids
for two satellites intersect [50, 54]. If two ellipsoids overlap in a conjunction analysis, a collision avoidance maneuver
may be needed. If they do not, the two satellites are considered safe, to within the confidence level associated with
the uncertainty ellipsoids.
There are a couple of caveats to the approach as currently implemented in the field. First, as traditionally con-
ceptualized, ellipsoid overlap approaches fail to account for the physical size of the two satellites [55]. To correct for
this, effective ellipsoid overlap should be defined as occurring when the minimum distance between the two uncer-
tainty ellipsoids is less than the combined radius of the two satellites. So long as the position uncertainties are much
larger than the satellites’ combined size, the distinction is negligible. However, satellite size should not be ignored in
problems with relatively small position uncertainties.
The other caveat is that, because the two satellites are treated separately, the joint confidence associated with
having captured both satellite positions in their respective uncertainty ellipsoids is usually slightly lower than the
confidence individually assigned to each ellipsoid. If each ellipsoid has a 1 − α confidence attached to it, assuming
independence between the data used to infer the two satellite trajectories, the confidence attached to simultaneous
coverage is
1 − α′ = ProX1,X2 |θ1,θ2
({
x1, x2 : Γα,1(x1, A) 3 θ1,Γα,2(x2, A) 3 θ2}) = (1 − α)2 .
In reality, the errors in the data used to estimate the two satellite positions may not be entirely independent, but the
specter of non-independence is easily resolved. Using Fre´chet bounds [56], even under totally unknown dependence
between the data,
1 − α′ ≥ max(0, 1 − 2α).
Note that if α is small, (1 − α)2 = 1−2α+α2 ≈ 1−2α. So, using 1−2α to represent the joint confidence associated with
the two uncertainty ellipses is both conservative and extremely close to the independence case. Thanks to the result
about confidence regions presented in Section 4.1, so long as one performs a maneuver whenever the two uncertainty
ellipsoids intersect, the rate at which collisions occur over a large number of conjunctions—i.e., the operational
aleatory probability of collision—will be capped at α′ = 2α.
For example, suppose one were to use a pair of 4σ ellipsoids to represent uncertainty in the positions of the two
conjuncting satellites. This represents a 99.9% confidence region around each satellite position. Moreover, one can
say with 99.8% confidence that both satellite positions are contained within their respective ellipsoids. And, more
importantly, if a satellite operator performs a collision avoidance maneuver whenever those 4σ ellipsoids overlap, the
operational probability of collision will be capped at 0.227%.
All of that being said, ellipsoid overlap does not mean that two satellites are definitely going to collide. Rather,
it means that collision is still plausible in light of the data. Performing a collision avoidance maneuver is one way
of driving down the plausibility of collision, but it is not the only way. For conjunctions predicted several days in
advance, prudent navigators will opt to gather more data, which will allow them to shrink the uncertainty ellipsoids
before finally deciding whether or not to make a collision avoidance maneuver. So long as they do not wait too long,
this is usually the most reasonable course of action.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we set out to explain and, if possible, resolve probability dilution in satellite conjunction analysis.
We found that probability dilution is a clue pointing towards a fundamental deficiency in epistemic probability distri-
butions. To overcome that deficiency, we introduced a new criterion by which to constrain statistical analyses done in
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support of risk analysis or uncertainty quantification. In satellite conjunction analysis, we identified Kσ uncertainty
ellipsoids as statistically reliable in a way that epistemic probability of collision is not.
In Section 2, we provided an in-depth analysis of probability dilution. We showed that the counter-intuitiveness
of probability dilution is due, not to an error in the mathematics, but to a mismatch between the mathematics of
probability theory and the epistemic uncertainty to which they are applied in conjunction analysis. We further showed
that this mismatch leads to a broader defect that we call false confidence. If taken at face value, epistemic probability
of collision will consistently indicate that a satellite conjunction is low-risk, even if a collision is imminent.
In Section 2.4, we investigated the pursuit of small epistemic probabilities as a way to mitigate false confidence.
We showed that this approach is inadequate as currently practiced. It may be possible to rehabilitate epistemic proba-
bility of collision as a frequentist test statistic, but this would require unique error rate calculations for each conjunc-
tion. The formulas necessary to support those calculations do not yet exist in the literature.
In Section 3, we showed that false confidence is endemic to epistemic probability distributions. In any additive
belief function used to represent a statistical inference, there are particular propositions that have a high probability
of being accorded a high degree of belief, regardless of whether or not they are true. This phenomenon constitutes a
previously unrecognized failure mode in statistical inference. Furthermore, the proof of the false confidence theorem
shows that this deficiency is rooted in the mathematical structure of additive belief functions. Representations of
inference that are free from false confidence will necessarily be non-additive, but non-additivity alone is not sufficient.
In Section 4, we introduced the Martin–Liu validity criterion as a new constraint on statistical methods. This
constraint is sufficient to prevent false confidence of the type explored in Sections 2-3. To our knowledge, it is the
only sufficient criterion that currently exists in the literature. Moreover, there is an intuitive appeal in the idea that the
aleatory probability with which belief is assigned to a false proposition should be restricted to a level that is propor-
tional to the amount of belief assigned. In other words, in a Martin–Liu valid belief function, a 99% assignment of
belief to a proposition is rationalized by the fact that, if the proposition were false, it would have at most a probability
of 1% of being assigned such a high belief value by the data. We find that symmetry appealing, and we suspect that
our readers will too. It could be that, over time, the definition of false confidence will broaden to include any violation
of the Martin–Liu validity criterion.
In Section 4.1, by proving that frequentist confidence intervals and confidence regions satisfy the Martin–Liu
validity criterion, we have identified a widely-disseminated and well-established statistical tool that is free from false
confidence. Technically, this is a special case of a theorem already proved in [49], but our special-case proof is offered
in the hope that it will be more accessible to a wider readership. In Section 4.2, we provided a simple derivation that
can be used to rationalize Kσ uncertainty ellipsoids as a principal representation of collision risk exposure in satellite
conjunction analysis, rather than as a mere screening tool.
In this paper, we focused much of our attention on satellite conjunction analysis as a motivating problem. However,
as the generality of the false confidence theorem implies, our findings have broad implications for anyone in any
field of engineering or applied science working on a risk analysis or uncertainty quantification problem. Failure due
to false confidence is a potential threat any time that an epistemic probability distribution is used to represent the
results of a statistical inference. We recognize the disruptive nature of this finding, given the current popularity of
Bayesian inference, in which results are usually represented using an epistemic probability distribution. Fortunately,
the Martin–Liu validity criterion offers a guide by which to eliminate false confidence in statistical inference.
6. Future Work
Much work remains to be done exploring the range of real-world uncertainty quantification problems that are
practically impacted by false confidence. In particular, risk analysis problems with closed failure domains are strong
candidates for severe false confidence. Additionally, a recent paper, [57], demonstrates that false confidence can also
arise in variables of interest as the result of non-linear uncertainty propagation (i.e., marginalization).
As mentioned in Section 4.1, though statistically reliable, confidence intervals and confidence regions are also
coarse. More nuanced possibilistic solutions to problems of statistical inference can be derived using consonant
confidence structures or Martin–Liu inferential models. In satellite conjunction analysis, the next natural step is to
evaluate the statistical performance of the alternative collision risk metrics mentioned in Section 1.1 to see which, if
any, satisfy the Martin–Liu validity criterion. This includes investigating the strategy of only using collision probabil-
ities computed outside the “dilution region” and replacing diluted probabilities with Alfano’s “maximum probability”
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[6, 28, 58]. The general invalidity of epsistemic probability makes this seem like a doubtful strategy, but strictly
speaking, we have not yet eliminated it as a possibility.
Finally, there is much work to be done in the development of basic statistical theory. The false confidence theorem
supports the frequentist position against epistemic probabilities, but it is unlikely to be the final word in the Bayesian–
frequentist debate. For example, nothing we have presented in this paper invalidates the classic Bayesian criticism
that it is possible to craft inferences that have good frequentist properties but are nevertheless plainly counterintuitive
[59, Ch. 2]. The Martin-Liu validity criterion is merely a new and necessary constraint on statistical methods used in
risk analysis and uncertainty quantification. On its own, it does not end the search for normative methods of statistical
inference, but rather, it moves that search to a new mathematical framework.
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